Whomever said that if the bad guys want in, they will get in, was right, that is very true. I suggest taking normal steps to harden the locking hardware on all ( not just overhead ) doors, but, again, a motivated bad actor WILL get in.
Operating on that premise I would suggest a quality security alarm system, with well placed ( quality ) motion sensors. Every square inch of the building does not need to be covered, but place the sensors so that, at the least, all points likely to be used as entry/exit portals are covered.
Install a backup battery on the alarm panel, and replace it every 3-4 years, IF NOT used. If you do have a power failure, and the back up battery runs down to flat dead, replace it ASAP. Once that type of battery is run dead, its' life is severely diminished and it is no longer dependable. They are not expensive. A couple of hours of no power, provided the battery isn't run dead, is okay.
Connect the alarm panel to a UL listed central station via a "POTS", which is a "plain old telephone system" phone line. That is the most dependable commo method. In serious large scale emergencies, a cellular panel communicator may not be able to call the central station, if the cell system is overloaded, or if your cell tower is out of service, or without power. Using a "phone" connection via a cable company is less desirable because all those amplifiers that you see on utility poles need to have power, and if even one of them is without power, in the cable path between you and the cable company head end, the communicator will be dialing like crazy, but the call won't go through. This is of lesser significance in built up areas, where the signal may take alternative paths, but is a problem in rural locations, where there is only "one way out" for the commo.
Ensure that the telephone wire, between your alarm panel, and the point where it connects to the telco system is underground so it can't be cut by a bad actor.
High end alarm panels are capable of communicating with the central station via two different means, and they monitor the phone line for dial tone voltage. They cost more, so depending on your risk and location, ( neighborhood loss experience ) may be worth the extra money. For the standard garage, with a "homeowner" assortment/quanity of tools and a normal car, or two, it isn't necessary, BUT if you have hundred of thousands of tools and several high value/collector vehicles, it may be justifiable.
Install a "tamper switch" on the door to your alarm panel enclosure, connected to a separate zone on the panel. Lock, and keep, the door locked, remove the key, and do not "hide" the key on top of the alarm panel enclosure. This prevents anyone with access to your building, from tampering with your alarm to facilitate a later break in.
Lastly, TEST your alarm. At least once a year, but two times, if possible, call your central station, tell them that you will be testing your system, and would they keep a record of your "trips". Then arm your system, and, keeping track of the sequence, trip every sensor in the system. After tripping one, wait a minute, or two to give your panel time to send the signal to the central station and restore itself. When done, unarm the system, call the central station again, tell them you are finished with your test, any further alarms will be real. Ask them to send you a print out of the "trips" that they received, and when you get it, compare their list to the sequence in which you activated your sensors. Make sure that each sensor that you tripped, appears on the list.
Finally, this only addresses burglary threats, if you do all of this, you aren't far away from adding a fire notification system. Think of that, during your planning and design.
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